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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ROBERT DENNIS EAGLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16189 
BRIEF OF APPELL\NT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of 
T~eft. a Class A ~lis demeanor. in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§~6-6-404 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court 
:nand for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant 
H Croft. Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, ROBERT DE:-JNIS EAGLE, was charged by 
:::for:nation ·..;ith the offense of Theft. a Class A Hisdemeanor in 
·~alation of Ctah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). On the 
---. .:: Ja:: ): . :..ug•.1st, 1973. :1e appel~ant ·.;as conv:.c:ed ':ly a jury 
On the 22nd day 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant. ROBERT DE~l!HS EAGLE. seeks reversal of 
the judgment of guilt entered against him and a new trial in 
the above entitled matter. 
STATEME~IT OF THE FACTS 
Two ·o~itnesses ••ere called at the trial, both '"'ere el'lployees 
of Z.C.H.I. Corporation. a retail store in Salt Lake County. 
Clarence Duwavne P::-ice. a securi~y operative at Z.C.:1.I. was calle~ 
to the stand and testified that on the 25th day of May, 1978, at 
approximately 6 00 ? ~. he saw the appellant and one Myles in 
the Z.C.~. I store :ocated on ~ain Street and South Temple. The 
witness' attention was iirec:ed :o :he two i~dividuals as they 
?roceeded :c an 1rea in the ~en's suit depart~ent :~e '"'itness 
tesci:ied that he noticed the :wo ~en and recalled :he :i~e as 
:he >tore 
·~ •• P- ~ ~ 
'. - - . '~ 
~C' -- - -- -~.) s:_- __ 
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shoulder, walked along an area in Z.C.M.I. where they passed a 
number of cash registers, through a short passageway into the 
sporting goods department, where they proceeded by another cash 
register. They then went on to the main aisle becween the 
sporting goods department, headed west into the book department 
and then proceeded generally in the direction of the north exit 
door (Tr. 13, 14). As the witness followed the appellant and 
:1vles, he saw ther:~ go around the sporting goods counter and then 
~ost sight of them. As he continued to follow them, he noticed 
rwo men's suits lying on the floor of the store (Tr. 17). As 
~yles and the appellant approached him, t~e witness testified 
:~at he showed them his Z.C.X.I. identification and told them 
:~at they were under arrest (Tr. 18). The appellant then told 
?rice that they had done nothing wrong and they were leaving the 
store without any merchandise. At that point, the appellant and 
:'-;~es attempted to push past the ,..,itness, who grabbed the appellant 
.:c a bear hug (Tr. ~8). Then the appellant told :lyles to run. 
''<es followed t;,.e appellant's advice, but was subsequently stopped 
~-; :·...-o other :.c.~.::: clerks outside of the store and voluntarily 
~r Price further testified that the 
J~~e::~~: did ~ot have t~e 3Uits ~ith hio when he was stopped and 
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register in the store (Tr. 22). 
The prosecution also called Mr. Van Thomas Whitesides, 
who testified, based upon business records, to the value of the 
men's suits found on the floor of the sporting goods departcent. 
The testimony of Mr. Whitesides was uncontradicted and certain 
exhibits which were entered into evidence without objection by 
the appellant (Tr. 30 .31). 7he defense rested without appellant 
producing any evidence or taking the stand in his own defense 
(Tr. 32). 
Appellant ~oved to dismiss the Information at the end of 
all evidence, arguing that at best the State had shown an attempt 
to commit a thef:. which would have reduced the offense to a Class 
B ~isdemeanor :he mot:on to dismiss was denied (Tr. 33-40). 
Counsel also requested a directed verdict pursuant to instructions 
submitted to the Court, which was also denied (Tr. ~5). Appellant'i 
Proposed Instruction ~o. ll stated 
You are ~nstr'...:.cced to find :t-.e ae:endant, ROBERT· 
JENNIS SAGLE. not ;;u:lt'l o: :he offense of 1heft 
as chaqed ~:: :~e b:omation. (R .... 2) 
.-\ :1umber of tJroposed :ns:r·..:ct:cns .. ..,ere of:ered ~:' the de:ense. ·.,;h~~~ 
were ref'...:.sed ~v :he Cour'::. 
_:::.- -... 3 .. .3 .:) -....:..::- -
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Ap!Jellant further excepted the Court's failure to give an inatruc-
tion on what is commonly referred to as reasonable alternative hy-
?Othesis (Tr. 44, Appellant's Proposed Instruction No. 6): 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant 
of the crime charged in the Information, or 
of any crime included therein, the evidence 
must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the 
defendant; that is to say, if after a full 
and fair consideration and comparison of 
all the testimony in the case you can reason-
ably explain the facts in evidence on any 
reasonable ground other than the guilt of 
the defendant, then you must find him not 
guilty. (R. 37) 
~e ~rosecution, through the Deputy County Attorney, also excepted 
·2 the Court's failure to give that particular instruction as re-
:·Jested ITr. 45-4 7). 
The appellant excepted to the Court's failure to give 
nooosed Instruction No. 7, concerni;1g the requirement of joint 
:oecation of act and intent (Tr. 44): 
You are instructed that in everv crime or pub-
lic offense there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and intent. 7he intent 
or intention is manifested by the circumstances 
connected ~ith the offense and the sound mind 
and discretion of the accused. 
All oresumotior.s of law, independent of evidence. 
are in favor of innocence. and a ~an is innocent 
until he is craved ~uilcv bevond a reasonable 
~oubt. And ln case~of a· cea~onable doubt as 
____ · .. :r.ec~e:- :--,:._:; ::;t.:.:..:: :.s sa~::..s:ac:Jril:; s~own, 
~e :._3 ent:.c~ed ':oar: ac~·.l::_':f_:al 1 R. 38) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purswant to t:tah Code Ann. §76-2-307 (1953 as aoended). The Court 
failed to give said instruction and the appellant took proper ex-
ception thereto (Tr. at 46) (R. 46). 
During closing arguments, counsel for the State 1:1ade 
reference to the fact that the appellant did not take the stand 
or adduce evidence. Counsel for the appellant made proper objec-
tion to that co~ent and such objec:~on was overruled by the 
Court at one ?Oint and t~en ~pon :~r:her objection, the Court 
On ~;,e ~cis~s J: :::--.ese :-e!:.a:.-~.s. a:;?e~~an:: ~cved ::J;: rt mistrial. 
these ~ot~ons ~ere ~en:ed :R ~s. :~9-192) 
L' •_ l' t' :~ 
7HE JE:!::;JA:~:- :;~ .4. ·.:~:>!:!:.:L.l.l.. C.-\:3E :S s:r:"I7LE~ -:-0 
nA':E ::1E ..:·~·'<-:· :::s::<.~r:-:::J =:; ei:S -=-:'iEO::Z':' JF :HE 
:.\SE .. ~~~;) ::-.:..::...~·?..::: -:-r::· SC :::s:::\:.:c-:- :s ?.E':E:?-.S :3:...E 
El-l:lJ?, 
.... 
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Jpportunity to pay for the goods, and as they approached Mr. Price, 
:he security operative, that they were not in possession of the 
~en's suits as those suits had been left near the sporting goods 
Jepartment of the store. Taking the State's evidence at its best 
:he anly inference that can be drawn is that the men changed their 
~:nds and withdrew voluntarily from the criminal activity. Counsel 
:Jr appellant requested the following instruction as Appellant's 
"~·loosed Supplemental Instruction ~o. 3 · 
You are instructed that it is an affirmative 
defense to a orosecutio~ in which an actor'3 
criminal responsibility arises fro~ his own 
conduct or from being a party :o an offense 
that prior to the commission of the offense 
the actor voluntaril'l terminated his effor: 
to promote or facilitate its commissio~ and 
either 
~) Gave timely warning to the oroper law en-
forecment authorities or the intended victim, 
or 
2) r.·.lholly deprives hi.s ?rior e:~orts of e::ec-
ti·:eness in the connissi.on. 
If ~ou find from the evidence that :he defendant, 
~OB~R7 J. EAGLE. wholly deprl'led his prior 
efforts in the commission of the of:ense of 
:heft of an'/ er:ectivenesS, :!len 'IOU :nust :':i.:1d 
hi:-:1 r10t ;;u(lc:' of that: charge. IR. 46) 
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Code Ann. §"6-2-307 (~953 as amended). This statute is found in 
our criminal code within the part on defenses to criminal responsi-
bility. At the time of t~e enactment of the new code, t~is defense 
2 
was new to Utah's statutory sche~e. However, the "renunciation" 
defense has long been established as valid at common law. LaFave 
and Scott. Criminal Law (1972) §75 at 519-20. A.L.l. Xodel Penal 
Code. §206(6) (P 0 ::>. ~9o.2). Dix and Sharlot, Criminal Law (1973) 
at 737 The legislati•:e ?urpose of t~is defense ~s to follow the 
pri~arv objective of :he crimina: law. wh~ch ~s to prevent crime 
It is desirable to provide an ~nducement :o those who have set 
a c~ain of cr~rnina: e~ents ~nto action to a:low them to take 
steps to stop the crirn~na: ac:ivi:v and ultirnate:v prevent the 
::: _..., ::' : : c f'l. s e - . --_: ~s ~~ ~:::~~a:-·:e ~~:ens~ :: ~ 
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cheir activity to promote the commission of the theft of the suits 
~y leaving them on the owner's premises and (2) wholly deprived 
~heir prior efforts at theft of any effectiveness by dispossessing 
themselves of any dominion or control over the suits. This was 
established in the testimony of Mr. Price both in his description 
Ji the appellant's and Myles' acts and his testimony about the 
statement made by the appellant when he said that they were leaving 
:~e store without any merchandise (Tr. 18). 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that an 
j·:_J~ea in a criminal action !"las a rig!"lt to submit to the jury 
·::; t!"leory of the case, and that such theory vlhen properl:: requested 
,~.culd be given to the jury in the form of written instr-.1c:::ms 
5t.ne v. Stenbeck. 73 IJtah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). In State v. 
-cnnson. 112 !Jtah l30, 185 P. 2d 738 (1937). this Court stated the 
;~olicable standard in determining when such an instruction must 
· e :::. ven 
It ~s admitted chat the defendant is entit~ed 
co 'lave t:!le jury instructed on !lis theory 
of t!le case if there is anv substantial 
evidence co justifv giving suc!l an instr-.1ct:ion. 
'135 p 2d 238' ; .:.3-44) 
~ere ·..:as substantial e•:idence to support: :he c!"leory 
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(b) ~ith the purpose to deprive him of that 
property 3 
The l'tah Cr i.::Ji.nal Cude deLnes the '..lord "obtain" as 
.:. bringinj! about a tr.1nsfer of oossession The Code defines "pur-
pose to deprive" as "having the conscious object to withhold 
property per:nanentl? or ::or so extended a per"i.od such that a sub-
stantial portion o:: its econocic val~e or the use or benefit there-
of would be ~ost. ur to :-estore ::~e ?ropert:: onl:-~ 1..lpon ?aynent of 
5 
a reward ur ether comper.sati.)n" 
~s ~~ear i~ :~e respect t~at 
appell3nt anJ ~v:es ever ubtained or exercised unauthorized centro: 
over the proper:v 
of the ~ec;uis i. :e ~·~r:Jose :o :Je:-::Janentl:: deori·;e the o•.mer of the 
::0 ec0nur.-:i..: ::..~:.:-:1,..;.::...Jr. ..... '.'3~·J.e. :;or · ... :as ::-:.::..s d -.:ase • ..;here :~e 
:':L' • ,L':-> 
See :;e ::-:.J.~ 
~::- ,";:;c::s eC 
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~~~minal plan or scheme when the property was left on the premises. 
Y~nce. the defense instruction was properly requested and it was 
er~or to fail to submit that defense to the jury. 
The instant case is distinp,uishable from the recent decision 
,f this Court in State v. Smith. Utah, 571 P.2d 578 (1977). wherein 
=~~ same issue was raised. In State v. Smith. supra, unlike the 
~nstant case. there was an actual conversion of real property by 
:~e defendant and a transfer of title from the victim to the defen-
:ant then to a third person and then the realty was encumbered by 
o :nc1 ·gage in the name of the third person In short, the theft 
-. chat case was actually consummated by the transfer of the 
~r:>Dert? to the third person and furthermore, the real::' dir::inished 
.~. ·:alue substantially by the mortgage. 
-~ch :ransfer or diminution occurred. 
Ir. t~e i~stant ~ase ~c 
:he merchandise was left 
-~ c~e store at a point where cash registers were still available 
... ::Ja·rment to be made. 
In deter.<i:-ti.f'g ·.;h-:ther a failure ':o gi.·,;e a requested 
.c.s:rucci.0n i.s prejudicial the question is "if the ~equested i.n-
.-~·~::i..Jn had ':Jeen gi.·.ren and t'-le j•Jr:' had so cor.si.dered :'-le evidence, 
"~~ ~s a reasonable li.~eli.~ood chac ~= mav have had some ef!ect 
·.·e :- i.:.....:: ~enJ.e::-ed". State ·· ;~: ::ci-'.esc:-.. L'ta;,. 560 ? 2C 
-=-··.(_~ ·:e;:·: ::-::':'o:-':ant ~a.c':s :.:-1 :~~s :a.:ie ·..;e:-e :~a: 
.e 
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out the instruction on the defense of voluntary termination these 
facts become insignificant. So it is reasonably likely that had 
the instruction been given such facts would have weighed heavily 
in the jury's deliberations and a verdict of not guilty may have 
been returned. 
The Court's !ailure to give t~e requested ~nstrJction was 
prejudicial because it also prevented the ao~ellant from presenting 
his defense. In State v. Papoas. \.:tah, 588 P 2d 175 (1973) this 
Court ruled that there was prejudicial error with respect to the 
failure to instruct on the de:ense of entrapment 
~hen there ~3 anv evidence which could 
reasonaDc'/ je cegardecr-as indicating er.trap-
rnent, the ~uestiun ·.;hether ~t is sufficient 
to raise a 'reasonable doubt that the defendant 
wou~d have ~c~itted :he cri~e. except for the 
~nducement bv the ~alice officer is for the 
~ur:1 :o deter::1:.:1e 
sss P 2d :~s. l -s-~~- :Emphas~s Supplied] 
·.~'hen there ~s anv ev:i..jence o: a defense ':he ?rejud:.c:e arising ::-orr, 
_:_--_-t" 
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~rfectiveness in the commission of the offense of theft. The 
case must be remanded to the District Court for a new trial in 
·.o~hich the appellant will be allowed to raise the defense of volun-
tary termination pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-2-307 (1953 aa 
a!'lended). 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 10 ALLOWING THE 
JURY TO INFER THE r:nENT TO COMMIT A THEFT L'N-
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO INFER THE 
CRUICIAL ELE!-!ENT OF INTENT. 
Over proper exception by counsel for appellant, the Court 
'::ered the following statement to the jury as part of Ir.str~ction 
::o ~0 (Tr. 6.3-44) (R. 57): 
. A person's state of mind is not always 
susceptible of proof be direct and positive 
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred 
from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances. 
T~e issue at trial was the intent of appellant and the 
iJ~~e ~nstruction allowed the jury to infer this cruicial element 
.: :~e offense in effect diminishing the burden on the State to 
-~:~e each and everv ele~ent beyond a reasonable doubt. 
::-,~s c:rpe of inscruction has recent::r been held to be 
~~ ~~e process of law under :he Fourteenth A~endoent to 
:~ Sands:ro~ ., ~ontana, 
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in the instant case relieve the State of its constitutional burden 
to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt by 
permitting an unwarranted inference of a cruicial element of the 
offense, the mens rea or intent. 
In the case before the Court since the entire issue 
centered around the intent of the appellant, the inference allowed 
the jurors in Instriction :-lo. lO "conflict[ed) with the overriding 
presumption of innocence ~ith which the law endows the accused 
and which extends to everv elecent of the crir:1e" Sandstrom 
v. :-lontana, supra, 25 Cr L. at 3163. 
L'nder circucstances of the instant case the Court's InstrC~c-
tion No. 10 denied appel:ant due ?rocess of law under the Fourteen~~ 
Amendment to the ~ni:ed Sta:es Cons:itution and Article I, Section 
7 of :he Constitution of :he State of Ctah. 
POI:-lT III 
:-HE :-~IA:. :rJL"~-:''5 ?.;::.:.:!U: cO :;r.'E -\?PE:.:.A;r:··s 
?~OPOSD :~<S;"R~C":":J~ J:; RESO~AB:.E _;;_:E:R.:lA":'I':E 
'lY!'OT:-1ESlS ·;;..s '\E'."ERS:3;_;:: ::::!\...RC?.. 
~--,,....,,,...,_ ~-
_e _e .. ·-- •1. 
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eration and comparison of all the testimony in 
the case you can reasonably explain the facts 
in evidence on any reasonable ground other than 
the guilt of the defendant, then you must find 
him not guilty. (R. 162) 
The instruction as stated was a proper statement of th• 
~aw as defined in the seminal case of State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 
39' 201 p. 2d 1030 (1921). 
Numerous cases have discussed the failure of the trial 
court to give this instruction, and the rule seems clearly stated 
:~at 
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that 
the giving of such an instruction [reasonable 
alternative hypothesis] is neither appropriate 
nor required unless proof of a material issue is 
based solely upon circumstantial evidence. 
State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1979; 
citing to State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 138' 
(1977) and State v. Garcia, 11 utah 2d 67, 335 
P 2d 57 (1960). (Emphasis Supplied) 
In the instant case the material issue of intent to per-
~dnentl? deprive Z.C.~.I. of the property was clearly based solely 
J. : ~ rcums tan t ia l evidence. There '.Yas no direct evidence of this 
e~ement of the crime of theft. :1oreover, the property having been 
;:andoned, the elements of obtaining or exercising unauthorized 
-·~:~~l ~ere totallv circumstantial since the appellant never left 
--= 3:ore ~~th che sui~s and indicated his lack of intent or 
~ ~' ::e State •Jt ;__::a" :onceeced :he ;::.rcumscantial 
'Ple 
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Attorney. Hr. Yengich, defense counsel and the Court reflects this 
acquiescence: 
MR. HOUSLEY: Your Honor, I am in agreement with 
defense counsel. He is entitled to an Instruction 
concerning reasonable alternative hypot~esis and 
I didn't request it. If he requests it, he is 
entitled to it. 
THE COURT: I was just going to make a cocment in 
the record for that. You both have indicated that. 
The Supreme Court has ruled in more than one case 
that that instruction is proper only where the 
evidence is all circumstantial. ' . .fuere we have 
evidence here that is direct and positive. eye-
witness testimony of two guys taking a suit, 
wrapping it in an overcoat, throwing it over their 
shoulder, starting to •.-alk out the store, that is 
not circumstantial evidence. I don't think under 
the facts and circumstances of this case the reason-
ble hypothesis instruction is proper, in any sense 
of the word. under the Supreme Court decision. 
Hith respect to :<.on's [~lr. Yengich's] comment 
about state of mind. I t~ink that were the statute 
itself expressly sets for the state of mind re-
quired as one of the essential elements of the 
crime. :hat we define that as one of the elements 
and state what the law is with respect to that 
state of mind. and that is all ·.-e need do in pre-
paring these instruc:~ons. [7he Cour:'s and 
defense counsel's discussion on a different in-
struction omitted] 
'~. YE~GICH And ~inal:~. ~r Hous:ev was 
speaking on :~e reasonab:e a::ere'.at~·:e :"l::pot~es~s 
I ~auld as~ ~~ ·1ou ~ave any:~~~g ~:se :~ sa~· on 
:hat :a...::~ 
~'R HOL'S:..E:· 
\' .... '~=- !-to nor-. ion·: sa:: · .. :r.a.:: sa:..c.. 
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ever, I feel it is necessary for me to advise 
the Court, if I think the Court is permitting 
error to enter the record, and it seems to me 
in this case it is because of the fact that we 
have to rely on circumstantial evidence to show 
the state of their minds, and in view of that, 
that being a necessary element, as I read the 
same cases as your Honor referred to, that 
requires a reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction to cover their state of mind or 
the possible other alternative with their 
state of mind. 
THE COURT: It is where the evidence of the 
crime is all circumstantial, as I understand 
that case, that instruction is proper and at no 
other time. Let me say this, fellows. I do 
the best I can in framing my instructions as 
I think they ought to be. You fellows don't 
need to apologize to me for taking exceptions 
to the ins true t ions I give. That is the pur-
pose of our ~eeting, and you are welcome to 
state any exceptions you want. If there is 
merit to it, I will correct my instructions. 
But if I don't agree with your exceptions, 
you are welcome to take them and I just 
simply have to take my chances with the court 
on high. 'P1at is the way I see it. 
(Tr. 45-47) 
The County Attorney's candid admission that the giving 
,- che instruction is appropriate and the failure to do so is telling, 
'aK:~g ~he error with respect to the failure to give this instruction 
;o•:i.ous Prejudice arises "if the requested instruction had been 
;:~en had so considered the evidence, there is a reasonable likeli-
'cC ::cat it ma:r "lave had some effect on the verdict rendered" 
Yi:cheson. suc~a Here the appellant had abandoned :he 
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not formed the requisite intent. That being an alternative hy-
pothesis to be inferred from the two separate acts the jury may 
have returned a different verdict-one of not guilty, or att~ted theft. 
On this basis, the judgment rendered in the District Court 
must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT :v 
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MIS-
CONDUCT BY COMMENTING ON THE APPELLANT'S FAILING TO 
TESTIFY AND TliiS MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE 
TO THE APPELLANT. 
In the course of the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's 
argUI:Ient to t:he jur:'. the prosecutor made t:he following remarks· 
[BY MR. HOUSLEY] . The third t:hing counsel 
stat:ed was t:hat t:he defendant did not t:ake the 
st:and. He t:hen stated--
~R. YENGICH: I am going to object: to any reference 
for the defendant: not t:aking the stand. Instruct:ion 
No. 6 stat:es it: is his right. It: is improper for 
counsel t:o comment: upon it:. 
MR. HOUSLEY Your Honor. I request an:' ar"ument:-
made to the Court be out of the hearing of~the 
jurv. 
THE COURT ~io. I don't know- how far ::ou are going 
to go. I suggest :o you that you li~it ::our co~­
ments He has dealt at sor.e ~ength about that 
and I ~i:: :et ~ou resco~d ~n some ~a~ Ycu ~now 
~hat the li~~=a~ions a~e and don't go be::ond :hat. 
:!R YE:iGICH L ~~-- :a~e ~x2ep:~on :2 ~~s s:are-
~ent at a:: a~o~: ~t 
, -~::.-::: -·-:as 
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stand because he could add nothing to what had 
already been presented. He could have added 
that he--the reason why he did not go to the 
first cash register over in that department. 
MR. YENGICH: I will object, your Honor. It 
is improper argument on what could have been 
added. I commented solely on the Court's 
Instruction No. 6 and not what could have 
been said by the defendant. 
THE COURT: Let's not go into that, Mr. 
Housley. 
MR. YENGICH: I have a motion on that basis, 
if the Court will allow me to reserve it. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. HOUSLEY: He could have--
THE COURT: Don't go into what he could have 
done. 
MR. HOUSLEY: All right. The evidence in this 
case shows uncontroverted by any other evidence 
that--
MR. YENGICH: Same objection. Defendant did not 
put on evidence. 
THE COUR7: Well, objection to that last comment 
is overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Housley. 
Defense counsel's motion for a mistrial was subsequently 
~enied. The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed 
~e ~as responding to was: 
Now, the issue. I want to caution you about 
a few things before we get to what facts I think 
comport with that view of the law and that view 
of the evidence. The issue isn't this :;oung oan 
cid :1ot take t~e stand anc tes t~f:"·; The Court has 
~nstructed ~ou in th~s Instructio~ ~o. 6 about 
that. I ca~tion d ~ou at :~e ouset, as I told 
::ou I caution ou. at :his ti~e, as I told :;ou at 
-=~e ,:_'ll_:_:=:;et. ::-:.1r: s :"""':',· .-::ec:..s:.or. as ::is a:tor:;e:t. 
- ~ 1 -
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I determined that one the basis of the evidence 
that was adduced, there was no need for Mr. 
Eagle to testify and I was happy with the 
evidence for your ultimate resolution as to 
whether or not this is an attempted theft, 
a theft or no theft at all. I suggest to 
you Hr. Eagle could have added nothing to 
that. 
Although counsel for the appellant did comment on the 
fact that the appellant had not tak~n the stand, he did so within 
the bounds of the law. He merely mentioned that the appellant had 
not taken the witness stand, that the Court had instructed them on 
the inference to be drawn and that it was counsel's decision to 
allow the evidence to stand. The prosecutor's comments however, 
were clearl:r co~~~nents intended to cause the jury to draw adverse 
conclusions as to why the appellant did not testify. It '.Yas an 
unfavorable comment on the appellant's exercise of his Fifth Amend-
~ent privilege against self-incrimination. 
In Griffin v. Califon1ia. 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme 
Court held that it ~s a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
?rivilege against self-~ncr:rnination to al~ow a prosecutor to 
co!!I!Ilent on an accused's :ai.lure :o :esc::..£::. The reasons that the 
Court gave for this hol.ding ·,.;ere :hat such a cor:unenc, if a:.:owed 
b~: t~e cour:s. ~ecornes t~~ equivalent of an of~er of 2videnc2. ~= 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ercising his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
In State v. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114 (1977), this Couct 
found that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not pre-
sented any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendaant 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. ~ith respect to a prosecu-
tor's closing argument, the Court commented: 
i<azda, 
Court 
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege 
of analyzing the whole evidence as a general 
proposition. However, there is a point beyond 
which it must not go in regard to the defendant's 
constitutional right just referred to; and this 
includes that it should not be impaired or 
destroyed by making comments on the failure 
of the defendant to take the witness stand. 
569 P.2d at 1116 
The Court went on to distinguish the case of State v. 
Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975). In State v. Kazda, supra, the 
found that the prosecutor has a prerogative and a duty to 
··~ 
argue all aspects of the case so long as there is no direct reference 
:o the failure to testify. The Court then recognized that: 
Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks 
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it 
was but a thinly disguised attempt to do in-
directly what the prosecutor knew could not 
properly be done directly; that is, to comment 
on the fact that the defendant had chosen not 
to take the witness stand, and to persuade the 
jury to draw inferences as to his guilt because 
of his exercise of that constitutional privilege. 
::ootnote omitted] ;69 P 2d at 1~:6 
=n Su.:e ·· 3oone. ·:cah, 53: P 2d s;: (~979), :his Court 
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he did not have his defendant testify because the prosecutor was 
a skilled cross-examiner. On rebuttal the prosecutor emphasized 
this statement in noting that the defendant had not testified. 
This Court found that "the prosecutor was simply emphasizing 
one of the reasons suggested by defense counsel as to why the 
defendant did not take the stand". 581 P.2d 571, 574. The 
situation in the case at bar is subst~ntially different than the 
situation in State v. Boone, supra. Here defense counsel drew 
the jury's attention to the instruction on the failure of the 
appellant to testify. then stated that there •.Yas no need for the 
appellant to testify in light of the state of the evidence (T. 8-9) 
In response, the prosecutor argued that the appellant could have 
given reasons why the appellant did not initially stop at a cash 
register and that the prosecution evidence was uncontroverted 
(T. 19-20). Obviously, describing the evidence that may be intro-
duced should the appellant testify goes much further than a prose-
C'..ltor co!r.!!'lentin/( on his own ability to cross-examine a '.Yitness 
In other jurisdictions when a prosecutor has even al~uded 
to the possible :ontent of a defendant's :estimonv when chat 
defendant has fai.~ed to test:if::. the cour::s have reversed convi-::~.c~.' 
In ~vers v State. 5-J S ·.: 2d i9 !~ex ~'r5l. the prosecutor a:-;·~ec 
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on to state, "Thus if the remark complained of called attention to 
the absence of evidence that only the testimony from the appellant 
could supply, the conviction must be reversed". 573 S.W.2d 19, 21. 
Likewise in Rachel v. Bordenkirdier, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir., 1978), 
the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter in a state prose-
cution. At trial, the prosecutor argued that there were no facts 
in evidence about how the victim had been beaten or when he was 
abducted because of all of the men who knew, some would not tell 
and the other was dead. On habeas corpus the Court of Appeals 
reversed citing Griffin v. California, supra, because such remarks 
c8nstituted a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Con-
,equently, the prosecutor's comments about the possible nature of 
:~e appellant's testimony in the case at bar constitute a comment 
on the failure of the appellant to testify. 
The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's 
~efusal to take the stand is a denial of his Fifth Amendment priv-
::ege against self- incrimination. Griffin v. California, supra. 
::·:en :hough the Court may instruct t!l.e jury to disregard the comment, 
.: st~ll has been presented to the jury and the juror's attention 
~as ~een directed to it. Psychologically, it would be nearly im-
."ss:~le for a juror to disregard such a remark Consequently, 
___ j be c~red neit!l.er bv a retraction nor by ac instruction, 
.• - 1~ errcr ~s subjec: :o rev~e~ bv t~is Cour: even ~f there was 
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is harmless or prejudicial was given in State v. Eaton, supra, 
where the Court stated: 
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings 
and the protections accorded those accused of crime 
under our law, including the presumption of inno-
cence and the burden of the state to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
believe that, on appeal, when there is a reason-
able doubt as to whether the error below was 
prejudicial, that doubt should '::le resolved in 
favor of the defendant. This is especially true 
where the error involved is one which transgresses 
against the exercise of a constitutional right. 
Consequently, the rule which we have numerous 
times stated is that if the error is such as to 
justify a belief that it ,ad a substantial adverse 
effect upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, 
in that there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there may have been a different result, 
then the error should not be regarded as harmless; 
and converselv, if the error is such that it is 
clear bevond ~ reasonable doubt that it was harm-
less in that the result would have been the same, 
then the error should not be deemed prejudicial 
and warrant granting a new trial. 
[footnotes comitted] 569 P.2d at lll6 (1977) 
Since the appellant was the only person who could have 
explained whv he did not stop at the first available checks:and 
the prosecutor's argument clearl:: implied that there ·..;as no reasor.-
ao:e explanation of s~ch conduc: It is reasonably likelv that ~~ 
such an argument :1ot ::,een :nacie. then ::he jur:: :nav have reached a 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE 
OFFENSE OF THEFT. 
The evidence produced at trial was totally insufficient 
to sustain a conviction for the offense of theft pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). That statute requires 
:he State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 
obtained or exercised unuathorized control over the property of 
another with the purpose to deprive him thereof. At best the 
State established the offense of attempted theft. Utah Code 
Ann §76-4-101(1) defines attempt: 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise re-
quired for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a sub-
stantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction is 
~~allenged on appeal this Court has stated "it must appear that 
~Jon so viewing the evidence reasonable minds must necessarily 
on:ertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
State v Wilson, Utah, 565 P 2d 66 (1977). In the instant 
3~e ~hen viewing the evidence rnost favorably to the State, no 
·,;;=na~~e ?erson could disagree that there is a reasonable doubt 
,- :oe ~:':JelLm: co!IT.1i:ted an:rthir.g :nore :har. attempted theft 
In :he case of ?ecole v ~a:Rares. 23 I~l App 3d 72, 328 
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N.E.2d 210 (1975), the defendant was charged and convicted of 
attempted theft and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal. The facts were very similar to those in the case at 
bar. In that case the defendant had placed a shirt and a package 
of underwear in a paper bag. He walked past a cash register 
and into another department of the store. He was stopped by a 
store detective with the merchandise in his possession and arrested. 
The Appellate Court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish conduct constituting a substantial step towards the com-
mission of the theft. The Court stated: 
The substantial steo was taken when the defendant 
placed the ~erchandise in his bag, and passed 
a checkout counter into another department. 
Although these acts required to complete the 
substantive offense of theft. thev constitute 
more than ~ere preparation and reach for 
enough toward the accomplishment of the desired 
result. 328 ~.E.2d 210,211. 
In the instant case the facts are even weaker than in 
People v. Falgares. surpa. Here the appellant was seen putting 
a suit under his overcoat, wa~~ing past one checkout counter into 
an 3rea stil~ wi:hin the store where other checkout counters 
were still available to pay for :he merchandise. 'P.'.en ·..;hen the 
aopellant ·..~as accosted bv che secur:'.::: J::'::':'..:er he :10 longer had 
the merchandi.se . . . . :~ ~:s ?ossess:on. 
. . . 
:..:'1a~:::..1::.or. 
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of the suit under the coat would evidence the necessary intent 
or purpose to deprive and walking past the first checkout counter 
could conceivably constitute a substantial step towards the com-
mission of the offense of theft. However, because the appellant 
was still in the store and it was customary to pay for merchandise 
from one department at the checkout counter in another part of 
the store, no reasonable person could differ in finding that no 
mauthorized control had been exercised over the merchandise. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL \lAS DENIED 
BY THE CUMULATIVE ERROR COM?1ITTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Each of the errors in the preceeding points constitutes 
~rejudicial error that would require a reversal of the judgment 
Jf the court below. But these errors must also be considered 
:o have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial. 
~ven if the individual errors are not ?rejudicial in and of them-
ie~·:es chis Court should determine that appellant's case was 
~~eoarabl;: prejudicial by the cumulative effect of the numerous 
7c~~rs at trial and hence reverse and remand the case for a new 
S:a:e ·;.St. Clair, 3 L:tah 2d.230.232 P 2d 323 rl955). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfullv submits t~at ~he ~ndi.vidual and 
cumulative errors as stated ~erein. ret1ui.re reversal of the verdict 
of the jury and :~e ~·..1dgment entered thereon. and the appellant 
should be granted a new :rial in the Third Judi.cial Distri.ct 
Court. 
DATED :~~s da'' vf Au['.JSt. 19"9. 
Respectfull~ subnitted, 
RONALJ J. YE:IGICH 
Attor~ev for Appellant 
G FRED c1E-:'OS (Of Counsel) 
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